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Abstract
This paper aims to explore the corporate governance of
banks in economic crisis and whether poor corporate gov-
ernance has led to the crisis. The aim of this paper is to
demonstrate the complex world of financial regulation
and that corporate governance is just one of the many
possible culprits in the economic crisis. The level of finan-
cial crisis has been unprecedented and as such the regula-
tory response has been prolific. The researcher aims to
discuss some of the reform proposals to see whether the
time is right to legislate and whether these areas of
reform indeed address the facets of the banking sector
that need to be fixed.
Introduction
Since 2007, the UK, as well as many other countries
in the world, has experienced what could possibly be
called the worst economic crisis in history. Nearly two
years into the crisis, commentators and regulators are
looking towards the future of the banking industry.
This nebulous glance into the future is discussed
within this paper. To examine the future in great
depth is always a brave and cautionary thing to do,
cautionary especially when no one is sure whether the
crisis is completely over, and whether the banks and
financial system have hit rock bottom. However, gov-
ernment is paving the way by examining what can be
learnt from the crisis and how to start to rebuild the
economic system that created the economic boom of
the last fifteen years.
This paper will therefore examine one of the many
proffered failures and causes of the crisis. It will not
delineate the crisis as it occurred since 2007 but will
focus on a retrospective analysis of the problems that
have been said to have caused the crisis. The paper
will then move on to explore one area that the govern-
ment is proposing to reform, namely corporate govern-
ance. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the
complex world of financial regulation and to discuss
one of the many possible culprits for economic crisis.
The level of financial crisis has been unprecedented
and as such the regulatory response has been prolific.
Background
Over the last eighteen months, the UK financial
system has collapsed. The financial crisis has hit
nearly every bank and financial institution and this is
now pervading the economy as a whole. Jobs are being
lost, homes repossessed, lives disrupted and the future
is insecure and uncertain. ‘Financial services are in
ruins’.1 As The Economist states, ‘for a quarter of a
century finance basked in a golden age. The 21st cen-
tury began with the enactment of the Financial Ser-
vices and Markets Act 2000. This legislation was
meant to be the panacea for all of the financial mar-
kets. It was the super regulator. Under this initial
realm globalisation and our economy flourished.
Modern finance improved countless lives’.2 However
things have not stayed this way. The Financial Ser-
vices and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 created the
Financial Services Authority (FSA), designed to be
the watchdog of the financial services sector. However,
the FSMA 2000 and the FSA have not stood the test
of time with the latest crisis. It was not sufficient to
stop the collapse of Northern Rock3 and the ensuing
financial crisis that has been experienced. Today we
can see that ‘modern finance is under attack’.4 We can
see this from the plethora of media coverage and criti-
cism levied on the banking system. The Economist
states boldly, ‘the golden age of finance collapsed
under its own contradictions’.5
The starting point, certainly in the UK, was the col-
lapse of Northern Rock in 2007. Initially the problems
with Northern Rock created a small-scale banking
crisis with many customers demanding their money
back from the bank.
However this was to be just the beginning and since
this date the banking sector in the UK has been pulled
into an economic crisis unlike any for over a century.6
The banking industry has been hugely influenced by
the sector in the US. This was initiated after a two-
year period (2004-2006) when US interest rates rose
from 1% to 5.35%.7 This meant homeowners
struggled and more and more people defaulted on
their mortgages. The sub-prime market, where lenders
lent to customers with poor or no credit history,
showed increased repossessions as borrowers defaulted
on their mortgages.8 This occurred from April 2007
up until the end of 2007. The failure of the sub-prime
market impacted on the UK market and with the fail-
ure of Northern Rock and the first run on a bank in a
century, the market took its first steps into a tumble of
decline.9
The list of failures and crises continued into 2009. It
Banking
* Senior Law Lecturer, Bristol Law School, Uni-
versity of West of England.
1 The Economist, ‘Greed & Mash; and Fear’, 22 January 2009.
2 Ibid.
3 Treasury Select Committee, ‘The Run on the Rock’, HC56-II
2007-08.
4 The Economist, ‘Barbarians at the Vault’, 15 May 2008.
5 The Supra n.1..
6 The Guardian, ‘A financial crisis unmatched since the Great
Depression, say analysts’, 18 March 2008. http://www.guardian.
co.uk/business/2008/mar/18/creditcrunch.marketturmoil1.
7 BBC News, ‘Credit Crunch Timeline’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/7521250.stm.
8 BBC News, ‘Sub Prime Crisis Sours US Dream’, 5 April
2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6528387.stm.
9 Times Online, ‘The Credit Crunch Explained’, 14 August
2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/money/reader_guides/
article4530072.ece.
Business Law Review December 2009264
also changed on a daily basis. It is not the aim of this
paper to cover these in any depth but to colour the
arena that future reform is based on.
The purpose therefore is to look at the failures and
criticisms levied at the government, society and the
banks and to determine whether the proposed method
of reform is firstly appropriate and secondly whether
reforming so close to the epicentre of the crisis is wise.
There have been many criticisms linked to the eco-
nomic crisis. One major criticism is that ‘finance is
rigged to enrich bankers, rather than their customers,
shareholders or the economy at large’.10 Similarly it
has been noted that, ‘the biggest danger facing Wes-
tern finance is not a fall in its earning power but a loss
of faith in how it works’.11 This lack of confidence and
trust in the system promulgated the economic crisis
that is the basis of the situation. It also prompted the
government to enact radical reforms and proposes leg-
islation in the form of the Banking Bill in 2008. The
government, by further enacting this proposed piece of
legislation, aimed to try and regain some of this lack of
confidence and trust. However, this is intangible and
very difficult to regain. The Economist, however, has
warned that regulators should not rush to regulate.12
Regulation is largely reactive to crisis, especially in
finance. After each financial crisis legislation has been
passed.
We can see that ‘trust’s slow accumulation pushes
financial markets forward; its shattering betrayal bat-
ters them back’.13 In the golden age of finance we saw
that ‘trust ... has evolved to [a] miraculous point’.
Today it lays in the gutter in shreds. How can the
government think that a piece of legislation that was
rushed through both Houses of Parliament can go any
where near restoring confidence in the market?14
Despite the enactment of the Banking Act 2009,
HM Treasury published recommendations for reform
that cover not only the financial world but also corpo-
rate governance.15 Before a detailed examination of the
HM Treasury reforms, the challenges facing bank reg-
ulation will be detailed. These challenges emanate
from the failures that were fundamental to the banking
crisis.
Challenges Facing Banking Regulation
Hector Sants, Chief Executive of the FSA, outlined
that, in his view, there were seven fundamental struc-
tural failures:
. a prevailing mindset of government and society pro-
moting the benefits of credit and asset inflation,
notably in housing;
. a flawed global regulatory architecture, which in
particular lacked adequate macro-prudential over-
sight and had a series of gaps with regard to the
oversight of financial institutions, particularly
shadow banks, such as SIVs;
. a flawed set of prudential rules particularly for capi-
tal and liquidity. Basel II is an improvement on
Basel I but still has large elements of procyclicality;
. a failure of the market to self-correct;
. a failure to recognise the overriding influence of the
herd instinct;
. a pro-cyclical interaction between the accounting
regime and market sentiment; and
. a lack of responsible governance by market partici-
pants, in particular bank management themselves.16
In particular what can be seen from these seven fail-
ures, and for the purpose of this paper, is that the
first, sixth and seventh of these demonstrate the turn-
ing tide of acquisitions, that it was the structural and
systematic failings of corporate governance that caused
the banking crisis. This leads the FSA to believe that
the future reform should based in two areas of reform,
namely regulatory framework and the supervisory
approach.17
Conversely, the Turner Review 2009,18 also pub-
lished by the FSA, shows an analysis of five other fac-
tors which illustrate what went wrong. Turner himself
outlines these as being:
. the rapid growth since the mid-1990s of a complex
variant of the securitised credit intermediation
model, with much of the risk retained on the trading
books of banks and bank-like institutions, rather
than truly distributed to end investors;
. the growth of leverage in institutions and embedded
in products;
. the growth of a shadow banking system – invest-
ment banks, mutual funds and off-balance sheet
vehicles – performing credit intermediation and
maturity transformation functions but not subject to
adequate capital and liquidity constraints;
. over-reliance on apparently sophisticated mathemati-
cal techniques for analysing and controlling risk;
and
. a classic cycle of irrational exuberance and then
reversal.19
Turner reiterates his proposition in speeches glob-
ally that there must be a return to simplistic banking
where there is a need for real economic delivery of real
finance.20
Sants surmises that the Banking Act 2009 and the
future reform proposals that will be proposed will
have a change of philosophy to ensure that these fail-
ures will not occur again. He states, ‘We need to
supervise to a philosophy that judges firms on the out-
comes, the consequences of their action, not the com-
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pliance with any given individual rule ... a better
description of this philosophy is outcomes-focused reg-
ulation’.21 His criticism of management and govern-
ance of compliance in line with the regulatory
approach is verbose. He aims to put into place a
system where banks are on the receiving end of the
intensive supervisory approach and outcome focus that
the FSA will deliver over the coming months. Simi-
larly, he believes that the role that non-executive
directors and executive directors should play must
change from the role they play now. Management in
banks must plan for failure and how to manage the
crisis if and when it occurs. Speedy action is required
from the governance of the industry at this time.22
Reforms to the corporate governance and management
structure will demonstrate this new ethos.
Improvements in Corporate Governance
Of the many reasons proffered for the failure of
banks, corporate governance has come under immense
scrutiny at the present time. In particular, the role of
the non-executive director (NEDs) has been at the
cornerstone of the criticism. Corporate governance of
banks is regulated by the Combined Code on Corpo-
rate Governance. The Code states that ‘every com-
pany should be headed by an effective board, which is
collectively responsible for the success of the com-
pany’.23 A normal board comprises NEDs, executive
directors, chairmen and chief executives. It is the
board’s role to ‘provide entrepreneurial leadership of
the company within a framework of prudent and
effective controls which enables risk to be assessed
and managed.’
Part of the board’s duties should be to set the com-
pany’s strategic aims and ensure that resources essen-
tial to the running of the company are fulfilled. The
board should also ensure that the objectives of the
company are met to the agreed standard by the share-
holders.
The Companies Act 2006 lays down the director’s
duties:
1. to act within powers;
2. to promote the success of the company;
3. to exercise independent judgment;
4. to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence;
5. to avoid conflicts of interest;
6. not to accept benefits from third parties; and
7. to declare interests in proposed transactions or
arrangements.24
The second objective listed here, to promote the
success of the company, is most pertinent to the bank-
ing crisis and review of the corporate governance of
those failed or failing organisations. It is for the board
to ensure that the company is promoted so that it is
successful. With a failed or failing bank this has not
been the case. The role of the NED is criticised
because HM Treasury believes that NEDs have two
fundamental flaws. The first is that NEDs often do
not have the necessary experience or qualifications to
oversee large and complex financial institutions. Many
NEDs have no formal qualifications in banking and
are part of the ‘cosy club’25 or old boys’ network in
the city. The second flaw is that NEDs often occupy
more than one NED role and it is believed that they
do not have the sufficient time or resources to devote
to each intuition, thereby not providing the necessary
checks and balances that are required by their indica-
tive role.
Banks’ boards and in particular NEDs should
acknowledge their part in the economic crisis. Mr
Varley (CEO Barlcays Bank since 2004) stated that he
‘entirely understood’26 the public’s anger. He admitted
that the banks were the ‘the single, biggest contribu-
tor’ to the crisis and could reasonably be apportioned
the largest share of the blame: ‘If you ask me as I sit
here today, is it understandable that the public senti-
ment is that the banks have the majority of blame? –
in other words, if you think about blame attributable
to any particular sector, is the largest particular sector
the banks? – I think that is a perfectly understandable
and reasonable conclusion.’27
Other board members of failed banks have publi-
cally apologised for the economic crisis and the role
they and their banks played in causing the catastrophic
events. The following apologies are those articulated
by the former chief executives and chairmen of RBS
and HBOS and the former chairman of Bradford &
Bingley:
Lord Stevenson: ‘we are profoundly and, I think I
would say, unreservedly sorry at the turn of events.
Our shareholders, all of us, have lost a great deal of
money, including of course a great number of our col-
leagues, and we are very sorry for that.’
Sir Fred Goodwin: ‘I apologised in full, and am
happy to do so again, at the public meeting of our
shareholders back in November. I too would echo
Dennis Stevenson’s and Tom’s comments that there is
a profound and unqualified apology for all of the dis-
tress that has been caused.’
Sir Tom McKillop: ‘In November of last year I
made a full apology, unreserved apology, both person-
ally and on behalf of the Board, and I am very happy
to repeat that this morning. We were particularly con-
cerned at the serious impact on shareholders, staff and,
indeed, the anxiety it caused to customers.’
Andy Hornby: ‘I am very sorry about what has hap-
pened at HBOS; it has affected shareholders, many of
whom are colleagues; it has affected the communities
in which we live and serve; it has clearly affected tax-
payers; and we are extremely sorry for the turn of
events that has brought it about.’
Rod Kent: ‘absolutely the board accepts it is fully
accountable for what happened ... we are massively
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disappointed and deeply sorry that this has hap-
pened.’28
These apologies, although needing to be expressed to
regain credibility in light of public scorn, do not go far
enough to demonstrate that lessons have been learnt
and that these board members are willing to change.
The apologies are practised, polished and professional,
yet they are lack lustre and lack a robustness that
should be shown in times of economic crisis. It is ques-
tionable whether the banks are sorry for being partly to
blame for the economic crisis or whether they are just
sorry for it having got it so wrong and that they were
‘found out’. After all, banking is all about risk and
gambling on right options, if the gamble goes wrong, as
it has, they are considered to be the culprit, yet if they
had got it right and the economy had been booming as
a result then they are rewarded. This reward culture is
what the UK has seen over the past decade. The
rewards have come in the form of remuneration
packages and bonuses. This is yet another area that the
government is proposing to reform.
The Walker Review
In July 2009, the Walker Review, headed by Sir David
Walker and sponsored by HM Treasury, reported
back on the reform of corporate governance in the
industry.29 What is clear is that this culprit will be
expounded upon for many more months and years to
come. This is but the tip of the iceberg for reform.
However it is an important starting point. The review
took place over a five-month period and looked at the
restructuring of banks boards as well as the behaviour
of the executive staff on those boards. The review also
looked at top executives’ freedoms and remuneration,
which could have promulgated a risk-taking approach
and acted as a catalyst for the economic crisis. In
essence there were five main themes of the review:
1. to assess whether the Combine Code remains fit for
purpose;
2. to assess whether the principal deficiencies of the
bank executives where behavioural rather than
organisational structure;
3. to assess the nature of risk within the banking busi-
ness;
4. to assess whether there is a need for more engage-
ment in board matters from fund managers and
other major shareholders; and
5. to review the remuneration procedures of top bank
executives.
The Review, which aims to be finalised in Novem-
ber 2009, offers 39 recommendations within these five
main areas. To summarise these:
1. to ensure that NEDs are suitably trained for their
purpose in the organisation and that they spend a
good proportion of their time conducting banking
business. Also, that the FSA has greater supervision
over the NEDs;
2. the function and performance of the board should
be much more stringent, with the chairman devot-
ing a good proportion of his time to the bank’s
business: the board should question the running of
the business more; the board should have relevant
financial industry experience and training; the
chairman should be elected annually, etc.;
3. the role of the institutional shareholder should be
communication and engagement driven;
4. a separate risk committee should be established for
each bank and should report separately on the risk
activities and controls undertaken in the annual
report; and
5. the remit of the remuneration committee should be
extended and should be involved in the processing
and signing off of top executive remuneration
packages.
Of the Review, Walker stated that he would act as
an independent reviewer of these recommendations
and that he did not want them to be placed on a statu-
tory footing but that they should be overseen and
regulated by the voluntary Code of Conduct. This has
been met with consternation by many in political
opposition of the Labour Government. Vince Cable,
Liberal Democrat Treasury spokesman, stated that, ‘If
the Walker approach is to have any value, then it has
to be obligatory through the FSA and not just on a
voluntary basis.’
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine whether the cor-
porate governance of banks caused the economic crisis.
Although government and regulators blame the lack of
corporate governance enacted with banks and that the
large-scale bonuses, created a risk-taking approach to
investment, there are many diverse, multilayered and
complex reasons why there has been such a prolific
economic crisis. All economies suffer in an economic
crisis. This is not in dispute. However the current eco-
nomic climate is unprecedented. Its ripple effect has
touched most of the global financial markets. The
paper looks at one of the culprits that has taken centre
stage: corporate governance.
The paper concludes that the corporate governance
of banks should be reformed in terms of the qualifica-
tions held by NEDs and in their not taking on
appointments if they cannot dedicate the appropriate
amount of time to currently held positions. Commen-
tator Wighton propounds that when a crisis occurs,
critics are all too ready to pounce on areas such as cor-
porate governance of boards and believes that reform
should take into account that businesses are only as
ever as good as those people within them.30 If we criti-
cise and reform too much then it could be disastrous
for an already fragile system. He states, ‘This sort of
thing looks too much like crony capitalism and is a gift
for those who want to overturn the whole system’.31
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Moreover, this paper concluded that the economic
crisis was caused by many different and interwoven
facets. Not just the issues discussed here, albeit they
are integral to the crisis. It is time to reform and to
refocus. Yet it is not time to curb the procyclicality of
the banks and development of economies. Aspects
such as good corporate governance are common sense.
What is not required is a strict regulatory approach,
but one that is founded on logic and allows the banks
to have the necessary freedom to undertake banking
business, whilst not allowing risky strategies to be in
place, culminating in traders conducting inappropriate
business.
To face a brighter future, lessons need to be learnt
and these can only come from dissecting the practices
of the past. Banking crises will never be far from an
active economy but the manner in which they occur
and the effects felt can be minimised by prudent and
carefully crafted regulation. To keep blaming different
sectors of the banking system is a necessary evil but
should be seen a fraction of the overall problem. The
contributory parts of the economic boom did not
equate to success but led to catastrophic failure, each
cannot be blamed in isolation from one another.
Addendum
Further to the above article the Walker Review pub-
lished its final report on 26 November 2009.
At the heart of the proposed reforms is the idea that
banks need to change their behaviour to ensure effec-
tive corporate governance. The Review states that
‘‘board behavioural change through clearer identifica-
tion of best practice rather than more implementation
of new regulations’’,32 would be the method of choice
in reforming corporate governance in banks. Further-
more, Sir David Walker stated in the review that:
‘‘Better regulation of corporate governance will not
guarantee that an economic crisis in the future will be
avoided’’.33 Therefore it is with this in mind that a
brief analysis and overview of the reform points fol-
lows.
The Review has been undertaken since February
2009 with a consultation period being beginning in
July 2009. This review process has been robust and
with much support but six main areas of reserve
remain, these being the:
a) overall scope of the review – wanted to encompass
all financial institutions so a call for wider scope;
b) differentiation among BOFIs – there are large dif-
ferences in the nature of business and risk charac-
teristics of major banks, life assurance companies
and fund managers which were not dealt with ade-
quately;
c) shareholder engagement by fund managers as being
the least implicit proposition;
d) degree of prescriptiveness – some respondents
wanted more guidance around ‘‘comply or explain’’
as this could lean to less flexibility in practice;
e) international competitiveness – to ensure that the
UK does not move out of line with other countries
corporate governance obligations; and
f) role of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) –
respondents wanted a more engaged role for the
FSA within the regulation of corporate govern-
ance.34
The five key themes of the July consultation were kept
and these received much support. These being: first,
both the UK unitary board structure and the Com-
bined Code of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)
remain fit for purpose. Secondly principal deficiencies
in bank or other financial institution (BOFI) boards
related much more to patterns of behaviour than to
organisation. Thirdly, given that the overriding strate-
gic objective of a BOFI is the successful management
of financial risk, board-level engagement in risk over-
sight should be materially increased, with particular
attention to the monitoring of risk and discussion lead-
ing to decisions on the entity’s risk appetite and toler-
ance. Fourthly, there is need for better engagement
between fund managers acting on behalf of their cli-
ents as beneficial owners, and the boards of investee
companies. Finally, against a background of inade-
quate control, unduly narrow focus and serious excess
in some instances, substantial enhancement is needed
in board level oversight of remuneration policies, in
particular in respect of variable pay, and in associated
disclosures.35
To put this more simply, the main aspects of the
review can be divided into the three areas of
governance, pay and risk. The most prolifically
argued point on the day of publication was the
reform to make banks publish and disclose the
payment of their top bankers who earn more than
E`1million and if the disclosure should be broken
down into bands of pay. The amounts will not be
attributable to any specific individual as the
disclosures are anonymous and meant to act as a
reference guide for shareholders. This
recommendation is likely to add little benefit to the
excessive risk talking that has taken place because of
the anonymity and secondly it is likely to add to the
bankers competing against one another. As Corrigan
states: ‘‘[T]o give bankers a league table to measure
themselves against is simply to feed their desire to
climb the pay ladder.’’36
Also within the remit of pay reform it was
proffered that the remuneration committee’s role
should be extended to cover the whole firm and be
directly responsible for the pay of all top earners. At
least half of pay or bonuses should be in the form of
a long-term incentive scheme with half vesting after
three years and the rest after five years. Thirdly,
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two-thirds of cash bonuses should be deferred.
Remuneration committees should disclose rights of
high-paid employees to receive enhanced benefits.
Finally, the chair of the remuneration committee
would face re-election if the report got less than
75% approval.37
The reforms suggested for governance entail the
role of non-executive directors needing to be
strengthened, with them taking responsibility for
monitoring risk and pay. Most non-executive
directors would have to spend substantially more
time on the job. They would face tougher scrutiny
under FSA authorisation process. Furthermore,
there would be an induction process for all non-
executive directors and regular training to enable
them to ‘‘assess risk and ask tough questions about
strategy’’. Finally, institutional investors would have
to play a more active role as owners of businesses,
especially if they suspected weakness in governance.
Active investors would have to sign up to a new
independently-monitored stewardship code, with the
FSA monitoring conformity to code.38
The third area of reform deals with risk. The
reforms suggested are that banks should have board-
level risk committees chaired by a non-executive
director. The job of that risk committee would be to
scrutinise and, if necessary, block big transactions.
A Chief Risk Officer would have a reporting line to
the risk committee. Finally that Chief Risk Officer
could only be sacked with agreement of board.39
The review has had a nebulous welcome. John Crid-
land, CBI deputy director-general, said: ‘‘Banks play a
unique role in the economy and have particular sys-
temic risks associated with them. They therefore
require different rules’’.40 This is similar to the HM
Treasury report41 in which it was stated that banks are
special and therefore have special rules pertaining to
them. Whether this is a desirable position to occupy is
contentious. However, what these recommendations
are said to ensure is that Britain is going to be the
toughest place in the world for pay policies. This,
therefore, has substantial issues in relation to main-
taining an effective and competitive workforce in bank-
ing in the UK.
The FRC will on, 1 December 2009, publish a draft
of its 2009 Code for Consultation of the Combined
Code on Corporate Governance, The draft review is
expected to advocate a stronger emphasis on values
and behaviours, along with more diversity and fewer
cliques in boardroom nominations. Other proposals
include the need for a more extensive and rigorous
approach to the definition, assessment and manage-
ment of risk, especially around culture, values and
behaviours. This will link in with the publication of
the Walker Review and allow consultation by banks on
the Combined Code for Corporate Governance.
What is clear is that corporate governance, and in
particular behavioural change, is in need of review but
it is doubtful whether: first, regulation can have a
drastic influence on bankers behavior and cultural atti-
tudes; and secondly whether the Walker Review has
gone far enough to capsulate the reform of corporate
governance. Perhaps with the Combined Code being
reviewed at the same time, these two reviews will find
a balance and put forward realistic and workable sug-
gestions for reforming bankers corporate governance.
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Litigants and Fair Trial: Harsh
Messages in Appropriate Cases
John Corrie*
Summary
This article examines the case of Cherney v. Deripaska
as an example of the court using the tools available to it
to find that a claimant might not receive justice in the
natural forum.
Introduction
The Court of Appeal has upheld a finding by the High
Court that a trial should be held in England rather
than Russia because of concerns about the fairness of
Russian judicial process. Michael Cherney v. Oleg
Deripaska ([2009] EWCA Civ 849) concerned an appli-
cation by Michael Cherney to serve proceedings out of
the jurisdiction on the well-known Russian business
tycoon Oleg Deripaska in connection with a long-run-
ning commercial dispute.
The High Court held that although the defendant
had shown Russia to be the natural forum for trial of
the action, the claimant had demonstrated a risk that
he would not receive a fair trial there because of the
defendant’s close links to and ability to influence
instruments of the Russian State, coupled with the
approach of the Russian Arbitrazh courts to matters of
strategic importance to Russia. The Court of Appeal
held that the first instance judge was entitled to make
such a finding.
The case demonstrates that the English courts will,
in appropriate cases, not shy away from delivering
judgments apparently critical of foreign judicial pro-
cess in considering the appropriate forum for resolving
a dispute. It also underlines the factual nature of that
assessment and the limited role of the appellate courts
in the process.
Facts
The dispute related to ownership of Russian Alumi-
nium (‘Rusal’), the world’s largest aluminium pro-
ducer.
Mr Cherney alleged that during March 2001 he met
Mr Deripaska in London and entered into an agree-
ment under which Mr Deripaska agreed (inter alia) (i)
to hold 20% of the shares in Rusal on trust for Mr
Cherney, (ii) to sell them; and (iii) to account to Mr
Cherney for the proceeds.
Rusal merged with two other companies in 2007 to
form United Company Rusal (‘UCR’). The effect of
the merger was that the former shareholders of Rusal
held 66% of UCR. Mr Cherney therefore alleged that
Mr Deripaska held 20% of 66% (13.2%) of UCR on
trust for him, worth approximately USD 4.35 billion.
First Instance Decision
Mr Cherney sought to establish English jurisdiction on
various grounds, including that the agreement upon
which he based his claim was made in England.
In a detailed and carefully reasoned judgment
([2008] EWHC 1530 (Comm)), Christopher Clarke J
found that the court had a basis for exercising its dis-
cretion to take jurisdiction since it was common
ground that, if the relevant agreement was made, it
was made in England.
However, in considering whether the English court
was the proper place for the proceedings to be
brought, the ‘natural forum’ was Russia. In other
words, the dispute was most closely associated with
Russia and the Russian courts.
In deciding on the appropriate forum, the court
applies the two-stage test from The Spiliada [1987]
AC 460, namely it:
(i) identifies the natural forum, i.e. that with which
the case is most closely connected; and
(ii) asks whether there are any considerations of jus-
tice which should prevent the court from declin-
ing jurisdiction in favour of the natural forum, in
this case, Russia.
On the second part of the test, following a detailed
assessment of a large amount of evidence, the judge
found that if the English courts did not take jurisdic-
tion, Mr Cherney would never take the matter to trial
in Russia as a result of a well-founded fear for his own
safety. There was also a significant likelihood of Mr
Cherney being prosecuted if he returned to Russia,
with a real possibility that this would be as a result of
Mr Deripaska using his influence to encourage the
authorities to prosecute, and a ‘distinct possibility that
the charges would be trumped up’.
As regards the question whether Mr Cherney would
receive a fair trial in Russia, the judge referred to the
need for ‘positive and cogent evidence’. With that in
mind he noted that it was common ground between
the experts that, in certain cases, the Arbitrazh courts
in Russia cannot necessarily be expected to perform
their task fairly and impartially, such as where ‘the
outcome will affect the direct and material strategic
interest of the Russian state’.
The judge then found that the affairs of Rusal and
Mr Deripaska’s group of companies were of consider-
able and strategic importance to the Russian State, and
there was a close link between the Russian State and
Mr Deripaska. Thus there was ‘a significant risk of
improper government interference if Mr Cherney were
to bring the present claims in Russia’.
Notably, the judge made clear that he was not find-
ing that a fair trial could never take place in Russia;
simply that there were inherent risks in the current
proceedings.
The English court therefore took jurisdiction. The
judge recognised that ‘the parties are not strangers to
England’ and that neither would suffer prejudice if the
matter were heard in England.
The judge granted leave to appeal because he con-
sidered there was an arguable point concerning the
second stage in The Spiliada test.
Dispute Resolution
* Associate, Herbert Smith LLP.
Business Law Review December 2009270
The Court of Appeal
Mr Deripaska’s appeal rested on three questions, two
of which are relevant:
1. If a judge has concluded in a service-out application
that the natural forum is somewhere other than
England, can he still find England to be the appro-
priate forum for the trial?
2. If the answer to that first question is yes, in what
circumstances can he so conclude; and did the
judge (a) direct himself appropriately and (b) if so,
did he have evidence, or evidence of sufficient
cogency, on which he could reach the conclusion he
did?
On the first question, the Court of Appeal consid-
ered the distinction in The Spiliada between the ‘nat-
ural’ forum (with which the dispute is most closely
connected) and the ‘proper’ forum (for the interests of
all parties and the ends of justice). That distinction,
held the Court of Appeal, highlighted that the answer
to the first ground of appeal must be affirmative.
On the second question, the Court of Appeal noted
that in displacing the natural forum, there is no
requirement for ‘cogent evidence’ or any particular
kind of evidence to establish all other factors which
may lead the court to be persuaded that, despite
somewhere else being the natural forum, England is
the forum where it is in the interests of all parties
and the ends of justice for the case to be tried. The
requirement is that the plaintiff ... should ‘clearly
establish’ that England is the appropriate forum in
that sense.
The requirement for ‘cogent evidence’ related only to
allegations that the claimant would not receive a fair
trial abroad.
The Court of Appeal then reviewed each of Christo-
pher Clarke J’s key findings of fact and concluded ‘it
seems ... to be an impossible contention that the judge
did not have evidence or indeed ‘‘cogent evidence’’.’
The Court noted that ‘in conducting that exercise
the Court of Appeal should be slow to interfere with
the judge’s assessment of the affidavit evidence’ as ‘It
is not the function of the Court of Appeal to go
through the whole exercise again unless it can be
shown that the judge has misdirected himself in some
way.’
The judgment also usefully clarified that the first
instance judge need not be satisfied that the threatened
injustice in the natural forum would in fact occur; only
that the judge should weigh up the likelihood of it
occurring.
Comment
Whilst the appeal is a blow for Anglo-Russian judicial
comity, it is an example of the court using the tools
available to it to find that a claimant might not receive
justice in the natural forum. Whereas a lack of litiga-
tion funding in the natural forum has previously pro-
vided the court with a reason to displace it in favour
of England (see Connelly v. RTZ [1997] UKHL 30) it
is more unusual that allegations concerning the integ-
rity of the system of judicial administration in a
friendly foreign State will make it to the fore.
Recognising the possible implications of the deci-
sion, the Court of Appeal repeated observations from
The Abidin Daver that ‘allegations of a kind that
impugn the integrity of a foreign state should neither
be made nor entertained lightly, but must be distinctly
alleged and supported by positive and cogent evidence’
but that ‘I do not think that the court is precluded on
the grounds of comity from considering them in a
proper case’ (per Moore-Bick LJ).
Interestingly, in Pacific International Sports Clubs
Ltd v. Soccer Marketing International Ltd and others
[2009] EWHC 1839 (Ch), decided in the wake of
Cherney, the Court was faced with allegations of judi-
cial corruption and political influence in the Ukraine.
Although the case was decided on other grounds,
Blackburne J ‘not without considerable hesitation’
doubted that the evidence in question ‘quite crosses
the threshold of cogency that the jurisprudence
required’ in forum conveniens cases. As well as the case
having almost no connection with England and raising
novel questions of Ukrainian law, the party making
the allegations as to corruption seemed content to liti-
gate in the Ukraine when it suited him.
Although Cherney was an extreme case, it shows that
the court will not shy away from harsh messages in
appropriate cases and that the doctrine of forum conve-
niens is alive and well for use where the European
Judgments Regulation does not apply.
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Intellectual Property
Are Software Patents Dead after
Bilski?
David Flint*
This month, I am looking at one of the seminal cases
of US patent law in the last few years; timely because
having granted certiorari1 on 1 June 2009, oral argu-
ment was heard by the US Supreme Court on 9
November 2009.2
The case dealt with a patent application for a
method of hedging risks in commodity trading; such
patent claims are often referred to as business method
claims.
From the perspective of a UK practitioner, the
notion of business method patents is a somewhat alien
concept, given that the standard requirements of the
Patents Act 1977 tend to exclude most business
method claims as they fail the industrial application
test; not so in the United States where this test is not
part of the statute.
The details of the patent application are not really
relevant to the legal discussion but they related to a
method for providing a fixed-bill energy contract to
consumers. The patent examiner rejected all 11 claims
of the patent on the basis that ‘‘the invention is not
implemented on a specific apparatus and merely
manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely
mathematical problem without any limitation to a
practical application, therefore, the invention is not
directed to the technological arts’’.3
The applicants appealed to the Board of Patent
Appeals and interferences which affirmed the rejection,
although on different grounds. It was held that the
examiner erred by applying a ‘‘technological arts’’ test
when the case law did not support such a test. Further
the Board held that the requirement for a specific
apparatus was erroneous because a claim that did not
cite a specific apparatus might still be directed to
patent-eligible subject matter ‘‘if there is a transforma-
tion of physical subject matter from one state to
another’’. The Board held that the necessary transfor-
mation did not exist here and indeed that the wide
claim (which the Board thought ‘‘pre-empted any and
every possible way of performing the steps of the
[claimed process], by human or by any kind of
machine or by any combination thereof,’’ only claimed
an abstract idea ineligible for patent protection. Finally
the Board held that the applicants’ process as claimed
did not produce a ‘‘useful, concrete and tangible
result’’ and for this reason also was not drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter.
The Appplicants appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which was argued before a panel of the court in Octo-
ber 2007 and, sua sponte, before an en banc court on 8
May 2008.
On 30 October 2008, the en banc Federal Circuit
court upheld the rejection by the Board by a 9-3
majority. The majority decision was given by Chief
Judge Paul Redmond Michel who characterised the
issue as whether the claimed method is a patent-eligi-
ble ‘‘process’’ under the patent statute (35 U.S.C. }
101) – ‘‘Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible
subject matter under } 101 is a threshold inquiry, and
any claim of an application failing the requirements of
} 101 must be rejected even if it meets all of the other
legal requirements of patentability.’’ Patent-eligible
processes do not include ‘‘laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract ideas.4
The court thought that a determination of these pro-
hibited areas of patentability were not helped by the
three Supreme Court decisions cited above although a
legal test could be distilled from them:
‘‘A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under }
101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article
into a different state or thing. See Benson, 409 U.S.
at 70 (‘Transformation and reduction of an article
‘‘to a different state or thing’’ ’ is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.’’)
‘‘A claimed process involving a fundamental
principle that uses a particular machine or apparatus
would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not
also use the specified machine or apparatus in the
manner claimed. And a claimed process that
transforms a particular article to a specified different
state or thing by applying a fundamental principle
would not pre-empt the use of the principle to
transform any other article, to transform the same
article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or
to do anything other than transform the specified
article’’.
‘‘A claimed process involving a fundamental
principle that uses a particular machine or apparatus
would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not
also use the specified machine or apparatus in the
manner claimed. And a claimed process that
transforms a particular article to a specified different
state or thing by applying a fundamental principle
would not pre-empt the use of the principle to
transform any other article, to transform the same
article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or
to do anything other than transform the specified
article.’’
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The Federal Circuit observed that as far as the
transformation-machine test was concerned there
were two qualifications; that a field of use limitation
was insufficient to avoid the prohibition against pre-
emption; and that conventional or obvious ‘‘insignifi-
cant extra- solution activity’’ did not make what is
otherwise a claim to a principle patent eligible. The
court added that pre-solution activity was equally
ineffective.
The Court then turned to what several of the amicus
briefs had argued; – the ‘‘technological arts’’ test – that
a patent eligible advance must be ‘‘technological’’ in
nature and rejected this on several grounds:
‘‘the contours of such a test, however, would be
unclear because the meanings of the terms
"technological arts" and "technology" are both
ambiguous and ever-changing. And no such test has
ever been explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court,
this court, or our predecessor court, as the Board
correctly observed here. Therefore, we decline to do
so and continue to rely on the machine-or-
transformation test as articulated by the Supreme
Court.’’
Turning to Bilski’s method, the Federal Circuit held it
to be patent-ineligible because it did not ‘‘transform
any article into a different state or thing’’.
‘‘Purported transformations or manipulations simply
of public or private legal obligations or
relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are
not physical objects or substances, and they are not
representative of physical objects or substances.
Applicants’ process at most incorporates only such
ineligible transformations.’’
Accordingly Bilski’s claim entirely failed the transfor-
mation-machine test and the Federal Circuit upheld
the earlier rejections of the Application.
Bilski appealed to the Supreme Court who heard
oral argument on 9 November 2009.
The Supreme Court
It is unlikely to be until July 2010 that the decision of
the Supreme Court will be known, but from the
reports of the argument stage, it appears that the pro-
ponents of business method patents and by analogy
software patents may be about to see the tide turn
against them. It appears that several of the court con-
trasted unfavourably patents for financial strategies,
risk management or teaching methods (one patent
quoted in the case had been for a method of teaching
janitors how to dust!), as against patents for inventions
such as the telephone or morse code that an inventor
might invent in a laboratory.
A report in the Wall Street Journal even went so far as
to suggest that rather than reconsidering whether the
Bilski method should be patented, the question was
whether the Federal Circuit had gone far enough in
blocking inappropriate patents. ‘‘ ‘If we don’t limit it to
inventions or technology’ or tie patent protection ‘to the
sciences, to the useful arts, then why not patent the art of
speed dating?’ asked Justice Sonia Sotomayor.’’
It is unclear which way the Supreme Court will go.
Over 70 amicus briefs were filed, many warning of
dire consequences if the other side were to prevail. On
the other hand, patents on doing business have soared
in recent years with patents for such unlikely subjects
as the Amazon.com one-click online shopping to meth-
ods for writing novels and making sandwiches. What-
ever the ruling, it is to be hoped that there will be
some greater clarity over what can (and cannot) be
protected. In a global world the existence of wide ran-
ging and controversial patents is an impediment to
global commerce and benefits no one.
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